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Experiencing a stimulus in one sensory modality is often associated with an experience
in another sensory modality. For instance, seeing a lemon might produce a sensation
of sourness. This might indicate some kind of cross-modal correspondence between
vision and gustation. The aim of the current study was to explore whether such cross-
modal correspondences influence cross-modal integration during perceptual learning.
To that end, we conducted two experiments. Using a speeded classification task,
Experiment 1 established a cross-modal correspondence between visual lightness and
the frequency of an auditory tone. Using a short-term priming procedure, Experiment
2 showed that manipulation of such cross-modal correspondences led to the creation
of a crossmodal unit regardless of the nature of the correspondence (i.e., congruent,
Experiment 2a or incongruent, Experiment 2b). However, a comparison of priming
effects sizes suggested that cross-modal correspondences modulate cross-modal
integration during learning, leading to new learned units that have different stability over
time. We discuss the implications of our results for the relation between cross-modal
correspondence and perceptual learning in the context of a Bayesian explanation of
cross-modal correspondences.
Keywords: brightness–lightness, pitch, cross-modal integration, cross-modal correspondence, perceptual
learning
Introduction
Perception allows us to interact with and learn from our environment. It allows us to transform
internal or external inputs into representations that we can later on recognize, and it also lets us
make connections between situations that we have encountered (see Goldstone et al., 2013). In
other words, perception can be envisaged as an interface between a cognitive agent and its envi-
ronment. However, our environment is complex and instable. Processing a situation may require
integrating information from all of our senses as well as background contextual knowledge in
order to reduce the complexity and the instability of the situation. In that case, what we call a
“conscious experience” of a situation should involve an integration of both a particular state of
the cognitive system generated by the current situation (i.e., perceptual state) and former cogni-
tive states (i.e., memory state). Accordingly, integration should be a relevant mechanism for both
perceptual and memory processes (see Brunel et al., 2009). In this article, cross-modal perceptual
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phenomena (e.g., cross-modal correspondence) are employed
as an eﬀective way to further investigate this integration
mechanism and its connection with perception and memory
processes.
It is now well established that cross-modal situations inﬂuence
cognitive processing. For instance, people are generally better
at identifying (e.g., MacLeod and Summerﬁeld, 1990), detect-
ing, (e.g., Stein and Meredith, 1993), categorizing (e.g., Chen and
Spence, 2010), and recognizing (Molholm et al., 2002) multi-
sensory events compared to unisensory ones. This multisensory
advantage takes place regardless of whether the sensory signals
are redundant or not (see Teder-Sälejärvi et al., 2005; Laurienti
et al., 2006). More interestingly, it also seems that people sponta-
neously associate sensory components from diﬀerent modalities
together in a particular, fairly consistent, way. For instance, the
large majority of people agree that “Bouba” refers to a rounded
shape while “Kiki” refers to an angular one (Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2001). Evidence like this shows a non-arbitrary relation
between a shape and a word sound (i.e., a cross-modal corre-
spondence, see Spence, 2011). These correspondences between
sensory modalities have a direct inﬂuence on online cognitive
activity.
Cross-modal correspondences modulate performance in cog-
nitive tasks. For instance, in a speeded classiﬁcation task1, par-
ticipants are faster at identifying the size of a stimulus when
it is accompanied by a congruent tone (e.g., a small circle pre-
sented with a high-pitched tone; Gallace and Spence, 2006; Evans
and Treisman, 2010) rather than an incongruent tone. Similarly,
in a temporal order judgment2 task, participants perceive con-
gruent asynchronous stimuli (e.g., a small circle presented with
a high-pitched tone) as more synchronous than incongruent
stimuli (e.g., a large circle presented with a high-pitched tone;
Parise and Spence, 2009). In both examples, a particular rela-
tion is deﬁned as congruent when the features share the same
directional value (e.g., large size and low-pitched sound) and
incongruent when the opposite mapping is used (e.g., small size
and high-pitched sound). Directional value is a psychologically
salient quality because many perceptual dimensions fall on a
continuum with psychologically smaller and larger ends (Smith
and Sera, 1992). Larger, louder, and lower pitched values are
all perceived as having greater magnitudes than their opposing
smaller, quieter, and higher pitched values. Using both speeded
and non-speeded measures, this magnitude-based congruency
eﬀect has been observed between apparently highly distinct fea-
tures, such as brightness/lightness and pitch (Marks, 1987, see
alsoMarks, 2004), size and pitch (Gallace and Spence, 2006; Evans
and Treisman, 2010), and spatial position and pitch (Evans and
Treisman, 2010).
The existence of cross-modal correspondences contributes to
our understanding of perceptual processes. Historically, percep-
tion has been conceived as a modularized set of systems relatively
independent of each another (e.g., Fodor, 1983). However, the
1In speeded classiﬁcation tasks participants have to discriminate one component
of the stimulus as fast as possible while trying to ignore any other characteristics
(see Marks, 2004).
2In temporal order judgment task, participants have to make an unspeeded
response on order relation in a trial sequence.
existence of a correspondence (within or between sensory modal-
ities) indicates that perceptual components are integrated during
perceptual processing. Indeed, Parise and Spence (2009) propose
that correspondences aﬀect cross-modal integration directly.
Thus, congruent stimuli form a stronger integration than incon-
gruent ones and, as a consequence, produce a more robust
impression of synchrony. In other words, the perception of a
cross-modal object requires not only multiple activations in sen-
sory areas but also the synchronization and integration of these
activations. In that case, features sharing the same directional
value produce a stronger coupling between the diﬀerent uni-
modal sensory signals and are therefore more robustly integrated
together (see also, Evans and Treisman, 2010).
Does the fact that cross-modal integration is stronger with fea-
tures sharing the same directional value mean that cross-modal
integration should not be observed with other relations between
features? An impressive amount of behavioral (Brunel et al., 2009,
2010, 2013; Zmigrod and Hommel, 2010, 2011, 2013; Rey et al.,
2014, 2015) and brain imagery (see Calvert et al., 1997; Giard
and Peronnet, 1999; King and Calvert, 2001; Teder-Sälejärvi et al.,
2002, 2005) studies provide evidence of cross-modal integration
between unrelated features. For instance, Brunel et al. (2009,
2010, 2013) showed that exposing participants to an association
between two perceptual features (e.g., a square and a white-
noise sound) results in these features being integrated within
a single memory trace (or event, see Zmigrod and Hommel,
2013). Once two features have become integrated, the presence
of one feature automatically suggests the presence of the other. In
this view, integration is a fundamental mechanism of perceptual
learning (see also, unitization; Goldstone, 2000) or contingency
learning (see Schmidt et al., 2010; Schmidt and De Houwer,
2012).
If this kind of integration mechanism is involved in per-
ceptual learning and cross-modal correspondences modulate
integration, cross-modal correspondences might be expected to
modulate cross-modal integration during perceptual learning.
In the present work we test this hypothesis across two experi-
ments.
The ﬁrst experiment was designed in order to test an estab-
lished cross-modal congruency eﬀect between visual lightness
and auditory frequency (see Marks, 1987; Klapetek et al., 2012).
To do so, we used a speeded classiﬁcation task in which par-
ticipants had to discriminate bimodal stimuli (i.e., audiovisual)
according either to the lightness of the visual shape or frequency
of the auditory tone. We manipulated the relation between the
stimuli’s features so that half of them were congruent (i.e., light-
gray + high-pitched tone or dark-gray + low-pitched tone) and
the other half was incongruent (i.e., the opposite stimuli map-
ping). Following Marks (1987), we predicted that, irrespective
of the task, we should observe an interaction between visual
lightness and auditory frequency. Observing such an interaction
would indicate cross-modal correspondence between those two
dimensions.
Having established this cross-model correspondence, in the
second experiment we test our hypothesis that cross-modal cor-
respondences should modulate cross-modal integration during
perceptual learning. To do so, we used a paradigm derived from
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our previous work on cross-modal integration (see Brunel et al.,
2009, 2010, 2013). Our paradigm employs two distinct phases.
Participants ﬁrst implicitly learned that a given shape (e.g., a
square) was systematically presented with a sound, while another
shape (e.g., a circle) was presented without any sound. Then,
participants had to perform a tone-discrimination task accord-
ing to pitch (i.e., low-pitched or high-pitched) in which each
tone (i.e., the auditory target/target-tone) was preceded by one of
the geometrical shapes previously seen during the implicit learn-
ing phase (i.e., visual prime shape). During learning, we showed
(see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010, 2013) that participants integrated
the visual shape and the auditory tone within a single memory
trace and as a consequence the visual prime shape was abled to
inﬂuence the processing of the target tone. In order to avoid a
conceptual or symbolic interpretation of our priming eﬀect (i.e.,
“square” = “sound”), a manipulation of the stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) during the second phase was introduced. Previous
studies (see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010) have found a modulation
of the priming eﬀect depending the level of SOA. Interference
was observed when the SOA between the visual prime and the
tone target was shorter than the duration of the sound associated
with the shape during the learning phase. In this case, there was a
temporal overlap between reactivation induced by the prime and
tone processing (see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010). Facilitation was
observed when the SOA was equal or longer than the duration
of the sound associated with the shape during the learning phase.
In this latter case, no temporal overlap occurred between simula-
tion of the learned associated sound and target-tone processing so
that target-tone processing took advantage of the auditory preac-
tivation induced by the prime (see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010). This
succession of interference followed by facilitation indicates that
the shape-sound form a perceptual unit that was integrated dur-
ing learning (see also Brunel et al., 2009 Experiments 2a,b and 3)
otherwise we might have observed only a facilitation irrespective
the SOA.
Basically, our second experiment used the same general
design. However, we introduced a manipulation of the cross-
modal correspondence during learning. In Experiment 2a, par-
ticipants had to learn bimodal congruent stimuli (i.e., either a
dark-gray + low-pitched or light-gray + high-pitched) whereas,
in the Experiment 2b, participants had to learn bimodal incon-
gruent stimuli (i.e., either a light-gray + low-pitched or dark-
gray + high-pitched). This manipulation of cross-modal corre-
spondences during learning helps us directly test an inﬂuence of
cross-modal correspondence on cross-modal integration during
perceptual learning. Themanipulation of the congruency of stim-
uli might be expected to lead to the creation of perceptual units
either more or less stable over time. Experiments 2a,b are crucial
to test this idea.
First, if learning cross-modal congruent stimuli is at least
equally strong as learning seemingly unrelated cross-modal stim-
uli, we might expect a replication of our previous ﬁndings (see
Brunel et al., 2009, 2010) in Experiment 2a. That is to say, we
should observe an interference eﬀect for SOAs shorter than the
duration of the tone at learning (i.e., slower target discrimination
when the prime target relation matches, rather than mismatches,
the association seen during learning) and a facilitation for SOAs
equal to the duration of the tone at learning (i.e., faster target dis-
crimination when the prime target relation matches rather than
mismatches the association seen during learning). This result
would indicate that participants learned new perceptual units
which integrate both perceptual components. Indeed, if such a
unit is not created during learning we would only observe a repli-
cation of Experiment 1 results in Experiment 2a. That is to say, we
should ﬁnd an interaction between visual lightness and auditory
frequency irrespective the manipulation of the SOA.
Then, with Experiment 2b, we might expect two diﬀerent pos-
sibilities. First, learning incongruent stimuli might disrupt the
integration mechanism so that we would not observe the same
pattern of results as in Experiment 2a. One could predict no
priming eﬀect (either interference or facilitation) if there was
no integration between the visual and the auditory components
during learning. In that case, one might expect a replication of
Experiment 1’s results. Alternatively, learning incongruent stim-
uli might interfere with the integration mechanism. That is to
say, integration might still occur but could be weaker than in
Experiment 2a. In that case, one would predict the replication
of the pattern of results seen in Experiment 2a, but the prim-
ing eﬀect (irrespective of the nature of this eﬀect: interference or





Twenty undergraduate students from Indiana University volun-
teered to participate in exchange for course credit. Participants’
consent was obtained for all participants in compliance with the
IRB of Indiana University. All of the participants reported no cor-
rected or uncorrected hearing impairment. All of the participants
had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and Material
The auditory stimuli, generated using Audacity (Free Software
Foundation, Boston), were pure tones with a fundamental fre-
quency of 440 Hz (i.e., low-pitched tone) or 523 Hz (i.e.,
high-pitched tone). Auditory signals were ampliﬁed through
Sennheiser (electronic GmbH & Co, Wedemark Wennebostel)
headphones with an intensity level of ∼75 Db. The visual stim-
uli were geometric shapes (a 7 cm square and a circle of 3.66 cm
radius) that could be displayed in two diﬀerent shades of gray
(CIE L∗a∗b3 setting value in brackets): dark gray (L: 27.96 a: 0.00,
b: 0.00), or light gray (L: 85.26, a: 0.00, b: 0.00). Across the diﬀer-
ent experimental conditions, the shape could be light or dark and
the background was set at mid-gray (L: 56.3, a: 0.00, b: 0.00).
All of the experiments were conducted on a Macintosh micro-
computer (iMac, Apple inc., Cupertino, CA, USA). Psyscope
software X B57 (Cohen et al., 1993) was used to create and
manage the experiment.
3L used to refer as the perceived luminance of the eye whereas ∗a (green to red)
and ∗b (blue to yellow) refer to the chroma.
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Procedure
After ﬁlling out a written consent form, each participant was
tested individually in a darkened room during experimental
sessions lasting approximately 45 min. The procedure can be
understood as a speeded classiﬁcation task (see Marks, 1987).
On each trial, the participant received a composite stimulus
(a particular sound + light combination presented simultane-
ously for 500 ms), one component of the stimulus was accessory
and the other was critical. Depending on the trial, participants
had to judge either the lightness (i.e., dark versus light) or the
auditory frequency (i.e., low-pitched vs. high-pitched) of the
stimulus. At the beginning of each trial, participants received
a visual warning signal (presented 1000 ms on the screen)
indicating which task they had to perform on the upcoming
stimulus.
Participants completed a total of 387 trials divided in three
blocks. For each trial, they had to indicate their response by
pressing the appropriate response key on a QWERTY key-
board. The stimulus-response mapping was counterbalanced
between participants whereas the other combinations between
our manipulations were randomly counterbalanced within par-
ticipants.
Results and Discussion
The mean correct response latencies (RTs) and mean percentages
of correct responses (CRs) were calculated across participants for
each experimental condition. RTs that deviated from the mean
more or less than 2 SDs were removed (this same cut-oﬀ was used
throughout all of the experiments and never led to exclusion of
more than 3.5% of the data).
Separate repeated measures analyses of variance were per-
formed on latencies RT and CRs with subject as a random
variable, and Modality (Visual vs. Auditory), Tone Frequency
(Low-Pitched vs. High-Pitched), and Lightness (Light vs. Dark)
as within-subject variables. For clarity, we report here only the
analysis regarding the RTs. The results for CR are comparable
to those observed for RTs. There was no evidence of a speed-
accuracy trade-oﬀ – a signiﬁcant congruency eﬀect (faster RTs for
bimodal congruent than incongruent) was always associated with
either a signiﬁcantly lower error rate for congruent pairs or no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
RT Results
As expected, our analysis revealed a reliable signiﬁcant interac-
tion between the Tone’s Frequency and the Shape’s Lightness,
F(1,19) = 7.03, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.27 (see Figure 1).
Regardless of the sensory modality of the task, participants
were faster to discriminate congruent stimuli (i.e., low-pitched
+ dark-gray, or high-pitched + light-gray) than incongru-
ent stimuli (i.e., low-pitched + light-gray, or high-pitched +
dark-gray). Planned comparisons revealed that participants were
faster to categorize low-pitched + dark-Gray stimuli than high-
pitched + dark-gray, F(1,19) = 8.01, p < 0.05. Likewise, par-
ticipants tended to be faster to categorize high-pitched + light-
Gray stimuli than low-pitched + light-gray, F(1,19) = 3.55,
p = 0.07.
We also observed a main eﬀect of Lightness, F(1, 19) = 5.09,
p< 0.05, η2p = 0.21. Participants were overall faster to categorize
Light-Gray stimuli (mean = 726 ms, SE = 34) than Dark-gray
stimuli (mean = 749 ms, SE = 36).
None of the other eﬀects or interactions reached statistical
signiﬁcance.
In this ﬁrst Experiment, we observed a magnitude-based con-
gruency eﬀect between visual lightness and auditory frequency
(see also Marks, 1987). Irrespective of the sensory modality
(either visual or auditory), participants were faster to catego-
rize congruent stimuli compared to incongruent stimuli. This
is explained by the fact that for the congruent stimuli, the fea-
tures share the same directional value along the two modalities
compared to incongruent stimuli.
Now that we have established a correspondence between
lightness and auditory frequency, we can test our predic-
tion that cross-modal correspondence inﬂuences cross-modal





Thirty-two undergraduate students from Indiana University vol-
unteered to participate in return for partial course credit. All
FIGURE 1 | Mean Reaction times to categorize visual stimuli in Experiment 1, as influenced by frequency of accompanying tone (left, visual
discrimination task) and to categorize auditory stimuli, as influenced by lightness of accompanying light (right, auditory discrimination task). Errors
bars represent ERs of the mean.
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of the participants reported no corrected or uncorrected hear-
ing impairment. All the participants had normal or corrected to
normal visual acuity.
Stimuli and Material
We used the same stimuli andmaterials as in the ﬁrst experiment.
The only diﬀerence was that we used four distinct geometrical
shapes (namely a square, a circle, and two octagons; see Brunel
et al., 2009) equivalent in area. Since participants should catego-
rize visual shapes according to their lightness, we introduced a
manipulation of the shapes because variations on a non-relevant
dimension has been demonstrated to contribute to improved
perceptual learning (Goldstone et al., 2001).
Procedure
After ﬁlling out a written consent form, each participant was
tested individually during a session that lasted approximately
15 min. The experiment consisted of two phases. The ﬁrst phase
(learning phase) was based on the hypothesis that the repetition
of a sound–brightness association that was not explicitly formu-
lated by the experimenter should lead to the integration of these
two components within a single memory trace. Consequently,
each trial consisted of the presentation of a shape (either dis-
played as dark or light gray) for 500 ms. Every shape was pre-
sented simultaneously with a tone. Participants were told that
their task was to judge, as quickly and accurately as possible,
whether the shape was displayed in light or dark gray. They
indicated their response by pressing the appropriate key on the
keyboard. All of the visual stimuli were presented in the center of
the screen, and the intertrial interval was 1,500 ms. For all par-
ticipants (see Figure 2), the shapes displayed in dark gray were
presented with the low-pitched tone (440 Hz) and the shapes dis-
played in light gray were presented with the high-pitched tone
(553 Hz). Each gray scale level was presented 32 times in a ran-
dom order. Half of the participants used their left index ﬁnger for
the dark-gray response and their right index ﬁnger for the light-
gray response, while these responses were reversed for the other
half of the participants.
The second phase consisted of a categorization task for tones
along the pitch dimension (see Figure 3). The prime was one
shape from the two set of shapes (dark or light gray) presented
during the learning phase. In this task, the participants had to
FIGURE 2 | Organization of the trials in the first phase of Experiments
2a,b. Each trial consisted in the presentation of a geometric shape displayed
in particular level of gray presented simultaneously with a tone. The
association between gray-sound and response remained constant during all
the learning phase and could be either congruent (left) or incongruent (right).
FIGURE 3 | Organization of one trial in the second phase in
Experiments 2a,b as a function of the experimental condition. Each
consisted in the presentation of a visual prime (either displayed in Light or
Dark) followed by a target tone. ISI, Interval-Inter-Stimuli; SOA, Stimulus-
Onset-Asynchrony; ITI, Interval-Inter-Trial.
judge as quickly and accurately as possible whether the target
sound was low-pitched or high-pitched and indicated their choice
by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard. It is impor-
tant to stress here that all the participants were instructed to
keep their eyes open during the entirety of this phase. In order
to avoid a conceptual interpretation of our priming eﬀect (i.e.,
“square” = “sound”), we introduced a manipulation of the SOA
(either 100 or 500 ms) during the second phase. We should
observe modulation of the priming eﬀect depending on the level
of SOA (i.e., an interference for 100ms SOA followed by a facilita-
tion at 500 ms SOA). Since participants learned speciﬁc bimodal
congruent stimuli, the relation between prime (i.e., dark prime
or light prime) and target (i.e., low or high-pitched tones) could
be the same or opposite compared to what was experienced dur-
ing the learning phase. In addition, for half of the participants
the key assignment was the same between the two phases and the
opposite for the other half.
Each participant saw a total of 80 trials, 40 with each target
sound; half (20) of the target sounds were presented with a shade
of gray that had been associated with the corresponding tone dur-
ing the learning phase, and the other half were presented with a
shade of gray that had been associated with the other tone. The
order of the diﬀerent experimental conditions was randomized
within and between groups of participants.
Results and Discussion
Learning Phase
The analyses performed on the CRs and on latencies revealed
no signiﬁcant main eﬀects or any interaction. These results are
consistent with the idea that participants performed the gray dis-
crimination task accurately (overall accuracy is 93.9%), and the
systematic association between a sound and a shade of gray does
not impact the visual nature of the task (see Gallace and Spence,
2006 for a similar interpretation). The same patterns of results
were found throughout the learning phase in both experiments.
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This phase led participants to integrate the visual shape and the
auditory tone within a single memory trace and as a consequence
the visual prime shape should be able to inﬂuence the process-
ing of the target tone during the test phase (see also Brunel et al.,
2009, 2010, 2013).
Test Phase
Separated mixed analyses of variance were performed on laten-
cies (RT) and CRs rates with subject as a random variable,
Tone Frequency (Low-Pitched vs. High-Pitched), and Prime-
Type (Light vs. Dark) as within-subject variables, and SOA
(100 ms vs. 500 ms) as a between-subjects variable.
The analyses performed on the CRs revealed neither a sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect (i.e., each F < 1) nor any interaction (i.e.,
each F < 1). As far as the RTs were concerned, as expected, our
analyses revealed only a signiﬁcant three-way interaction between
SOA, the Tone’s Frequency and the Prime’s Type, F(1,30)= 10.16,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.25. As we can see in Table 1 the priming eﬀect
was reversed for the diﬀerent SOAs.
Separate analyses of variance were performed for each SOA
in order to further investigate these results. For the 100-ms
SOA (see Figure 4) the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between Tone Frequency and Prime-Type, F(1,15) = 5.21,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.26. In that condition of SOA, participants
where signiﬁcantly slower to categorize a high-pitched tone
preceded by a light-gray visual prime than a dark-gray visual
prime, F(1,15) = 11.52, p < 0.05. However, for the low-pitched
target the type of prime did not inﬂuence the categoriza-
tion, F < 1.
For the 500-ms SOA (see Figure 4), the analysis revealed a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between Tone Frequency and Prime-Type,
F(1,15) = 5.19, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.26. Participants where signiﬁ-
cantly faster to categorize low-pitched tones preceded by a dark-
gray visual prime than a light-gray visual prime, F(1,15) = 15.11,
p < 0.05. However, for the high-pitched target the type of prime
did not inﬂuence the categorization, F < 1.
The overall pattern of results presented here replicates what
was observed in Brunel et al. (2009; Experiment 1). Indeed, we
observed an interference eﬀect for 100 ms SOA in which par-
ticipants were slower at discriminating the target tone when
the prime-target relation matched with the association seen
during learning compared to when there was a mismatch in
the prime-target relation. Conversely, for the 500 ms SOA,
we observed that participants were faster at discriminating the
target when the prime-target relation matched the association
seen during learning. In sum, learning cross-modal congru-
ent stimuli leads to a pattern of results that is comparable
with learning cross-modal stimuli that are unrelated. This result
indicates that participants have learned new perceptual units
which integrate both perceptual components. Indeed, if such
a unit were not created during learning we would have only
observed a replication of Experiment 1 results in Experiment
2a. That is to say, we should have found an interaction between
visual lightness and auditory frequency irrespective of SOA.
We turn now to Experiment 2b to explore the role of incon-





Thirty-two undergraduate students from Indiana University vol-
unteered to participate in return for partial course credit. All
the participants reported no corrected or uncorrected hearing
impairment. All of the participants had normal or corrected to
the normal visual acuity.
Stimuli, Material, and Procedure
We used the same stimuli, materials, and experimental design as
in Experiment 2a. The only exception was that participants were
exposed to incongruent stimuli (see Figure 2) during learning.
TABLE 1 | Mean response times (RT) and mean percentages of correct responses (CRs) in each experimental condition in Experiment 2.
SOA
Learning phase 100 ms 500 ms
440 Hz 523 Hz 440 Hz 523 Hz
Prime Tone RT (ms) CR (%) RT (ms) CR (%) RT (ms) CR (%) RT (ms) CR (%)
Experiment 2a
Dark-Gray 440 Hz 539 (33) 87.6 (3.8) 508 (37) 85.5 (2.4) 504 (45) 82.7(5.0) 540 (46) 82.7 (4.6)
Light-Gray 523 Hz 538 (35) 82.3 (3.8) 558 (39) 83.9 (2.9) 582 (55) 84.1 (4.9) 549 (39) 80.7 (3.3)
Priming Effect +1 +50 −78 9
Experiment 2b
Dark-Gray 523 Hz 437 (33) 91.0 (2.3) 470 (36) 84.7 (2.2) 504 (44) 92.5 (1.4) 495 (40) 90.1 (2.4)
Light-Gray 440 Hz 475 (36) 85.2 (2.1) 461 (34) 88.4 (1.7) 477 (39) 90.2 (2.4) 515 (45) 88.8 (2.2)
Priming Effect +37 +9 −27 −20
SEs in parenthesis. Priming effects were obtained by subtracting the matching condition from the mismatching condition. Negative values indicate facilitation effects
whereas positive values indicate interference effects.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean Reaction times to categorize auditory stimuli, as influenced by visual prime presented 100 ms (right) or 500 ms (left) in




Separated mixed analyses of variance were performed on laten-
cies RT and CRs rates with subject as a random variable, Tone
Frequency (Low-Pitched vs. High-Pitched), and Prime-Type
(Light vs. Dark) as within-subject variables, and SOA (100 ms vs.
500 ms) as between-subjects variables. The analyses performed
revealed only a signiﬁcant three-way interaction between SOA,
Tone Frequency and Prime-Type, respectively, F(1,30) = 14.96,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.33 for RTs and F(1, 30) = 4.83, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.14 for CR rates. For clarity, we further report here only
the analysis regarding the RTs since the results on CR are com-
parable to those observed for RTs (see Table 1). As we can see in
Table 1 the priming eﬀect was reversed for the diﬀerent SOAs but
the same for the diﬀerent experiments.
Separate analyses of variance were performed for each SOA
in order to interpret these results. For the 100-ms SOA (see
Figure 4) the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between
Tone Frequency and Prime-Type, F(1,15) = 7.15, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.32. With this short SOA, participants where signiﬁcantly
slower to categorize low-pitched tone preceded by a light-gray
visual prime than a dark-gray visual prime, F(1,15) = 6.74,
p < 0.05. However, for the high-pitched target the type of prime
did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the categorization, F(1,15) = 1.07,
p = 0.31, but the trend is consistent with an interference prim-
ing eﬀect, i.e., participants were slower to categorize high-pitched
tone preceded by a dark-gray visual prime than a light-gray visual
prime (see Table 1).
For the 500-ms SOA (see Figure 4), the analysis only revealed
a signiﬁcant interaction between Tone Frequency and Prime-
Type, F(1,15) = 7.84, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.34. In that condition
of SOA, participants where signiﬁcantly faster to categorize a
low-pitched tone preceded by a light-gray visual prime than a
dark-gray visual prime, F(1,15)= 6.74, p< 0.05. However, for the
high-pitched target the type of prime did not signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence the categorization, F(1,15) = 2.84, p = 0.11, but the trend
is also consistent with a facilitation priming eﬀect, i.e., partici-
pants were faster to categorize high-pitched tone preceded by a
dark-gray visual prime than a light-gray visual prime.
The overall pattern of results replicates those observed in
Experiment 2a. However, the manipulation of the cross-modal
correspondence at learning had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
size of the priming eﬀect irrespective of interference or facilita-
tion (Mann–Whitney U test, Z = 1.81, p < 0.05), with a smaller
priming eﬀect seen for Experiment 2b (Mean = 20 ms) than
for Experiment 2a (Mean = 34 ms). This diﬀerence might indi-
cate that the decay of the priming eﬀect over time is faster for
incongruent stimuli at learning than for congruent stimuli at
learning.
General Discussion
The aim of the present study was to provide evidence in sup-
port of the assumption that cross-modal correspondences mod-
ulate cross-modal integration during perceptual learning. In our
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ﬁrst Experiment, we established a cross-modal correspondence
between visual lightness and auditory frequency (see also Marks,
1987). Indeed, regardless of the sensory modality of the task,
participants were faster to categorize congruent stimuli (i.e.,
High-pitched + Light-Gray or Low-pitched + Dark-gray) com-
pared to incongruent stimuli (i.e., the opposite mapping between
lightness and auditory frequency). This result is consistent with
previous results on cross-modal correspondence (see Gallace
and Spence, 2006; Evans and Treisman, 2010; for a review see
Spence, 2011). Our second Experiment explored whether learn-
ing bimodal congruent or incongruent stimuli inﬂuenced the
integration mechanism. This idea is consistent with experimental
evidence showing that cross-modal integration is involved during
perceptual learning (see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010, 2013; Zmigrod
and Hommel, 2013) and with experimental work showing that
cross-modal correspondences modulate cross-modal integration
(see Parise and Spence, 2009). Our experiment used an original
priming paradigm that we have designed to study cross-modal
perceptual learning (see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010, 2013). In this
paradigm, during a learning phase, participants implicitly learn
an audiovisual perceptual unit (e.g. a “sound square”). Then, the
consecutive phase allows us to test for the existence of such a unit
as well as its nature. To do so, we ask participants to categorize
target tones preceded by a visual prime. In our previous studies,
we showed a priming eﬀect from the visual prime to the target
tone limited to the visual prime that was presented with a sound
during the learning phase. This result indicates that participants
integrated the visual and auditory features and thus the presence
of one feature as a prime automatically triggers the other. In the
same vein, Meyer et al. (2007) showed that processing of a visual
component (i.e., a red ﬂash) that was previously presented with a
sound (i.e., a telephone ringing) produced auditory cortex activa-
tion. Most interestingly, the manipulation of the SOA during the
test phase allows us to rule out a conceptual or symbolic interpre-
tation of the priming eﬀect. In our previous studies, depending
on the SOA value (i.e., shorter or at the same duration than the
duration of the association during learning), we observed either
an interference eﬀect or a facilitation eﬀect. The facilitation or
interference of the priming eﬀects depends on the temporal over-
lap between sound–target processing and the reactivation of an
auditory component by the visual prime (for similar considera-
tion, see Riou et al., 2014). It is therefore essentially this variability
in the inﬂuence of the prime as a function of SOA that shows
the perceptual nature of the cross-modal learnt unit. In sum, with
our paradigm, we are able to test the implication of a cross-modal
integration mechanism during learning.
In Experiment 2a, we showed that learning a congruent cross-
modal stimulus produces a priming eﬀect consistent with previ-
ous ﬁndings (i.e., interference followed by facilitation depending
with increasing SOA, see Brunel et al., 2009). This conﬁrms that
participants exposed to an association between a visual com-
ponent and an auditory component presented simultaneously
created an integrated memory trace (see Versace et al., 2014) or
event (see Zmigrod and Hommel, 2013). Once integrated, each
component is no longer accessible individually without an eﬀect
of the other component. As a consequence, when participants
see the visual component by itself, the auditory component is
automatically activated as well. Moreover, the facilitation or inter-
ference of the priming eﬀect was dependent on the temporal
overlap between sound-target processing and auditory compo-
nent reactivation (i.e., SOA manipulation). We interpreted this
modulation as evidence of the perceptual nature of the memory
component reactivated by the visual prime and thus the integra-
tion between these two components within a memory trace or
event (see also, Brunel et al., 2009; Zmigrod and Hommel, 2010,
2013). However, these results are not just a replication of previ-
ous results because of our manipulation of the pre-experimental
correspondence between sensory dimensions. Indeed, to the best
of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time it has been shown that
participants integrate the speciﬁc relation between perceptual fea-
tures. In our previous studies (Brunel et al., 2009, 2010, 2013),
the relation between the prime and the target was at a dimen-
sional level (i.e., the prime and the target shared or did not share a
sound dimension).With Experiment 2a, the prime-target relation
is at the feature level (i.e., prime-target relations were congru-
ent or incongruent with the previously learned associations).
Moreover, we showed that participants actively learned such a
relation despite the fact that the relation between the features
is already congruent. This is evident by comparing the results
observed in Experiment 1 and those observed in Experiment 2a.
In Experiment 1, we showed a cross-modal congruency eﬀect
between visual lightness and auditory frequency. Participants
were faster at processing congruent stimuli (i.e., either dark
gray + low-pitched or light gray + high-pitched) compared to
incongruent ones (i.e., the opposite mapping). In Experiment 2a,
this eﬀect was modulated by the SOA. According to our previous
work (see Brunel et al., 2009, 2010, 2013), this modulation nec-
essarily indicates that participants have learned a new perceptual
unit. Otherwise, we should have only observed a replication of
Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2b, we showed that, even when participants
learn an incongruent association, the same pattern of priming
eﬀect is still observed at test. This result indicates that learning
incongruent stimuli does not disrupt the cross-modal integration.
However, a comparison of the priming eﬀect observed between
Experiments 2a,b indicates a smaller priming eﬀect with learned
incongruent units than with congruent ones. It is possible that the
cross-modal correspondence inﬂuences integration. Indeed, the
diﬀerence in the size of the priming eﬀect between Experiments
2a,b might be due to diﬀerent decay functions over the time.
Because the priming eﬀect reported in our experiments is a conse-
quence of the newly integrated units (i.e., 32 presentations during
learning), one might assume that the units will decline over time.
In other words, since bimodal incongruent stimuli were only
learned during our experiment, the association would probably
be expected to decay faster than a congruent correspondence that
has the strength of having been reinforced frequently in the past
(see Marks, 1987). So our results seem to indicate that only a
weak form of integration can be created in such a short period
of time.
Spence (2011) proposed cross-modal correspondences can be
understood in terms of Bayesian priors. The general idea is that
humans may combine stimuli in a statistically optimal manner
by combining prior knowledge and sensory information and
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weighting each of them by their relative reliabilities. In such
an approach, cross-modal correspondences could be modeled in
terms of prior knowledge (see Ernst, 2007; Parise and Spence,
2009; Spence, 2011). According to this model, the cognitive sys-
tem establishes relations (or couplings) between stimuli in order
to adapt to the situation and its constraints. The prior knowledge
about the stimulus mapping has a consequence on the coupling
of the stimuli (or the integration, see Ernst, 2007). The greater
the prior knowledge in the system about the fact that two stim-
uli belong together, the stronger these stimuli will be coupled. In
other words, the stronger the coupling, the most likely unisen-
sory signals would be fused together, leading to the creation of
a multisensory units. One major consequence would be an ele-
vation of the discrimination threshold to detect internal conﬂict
within a stimulus (e.g., asynchronous presentation, see Parise and
Spence, 2009). In Experiment 1, we showed that prior knowledge
about coupling between auditory frequency and visual lightness
increases the perceptual processing of cross-modal congruent
stimuli compared to incongruent ones. More interestingly, in
Experiments 2a,b, we manipulated the prior knowledge distribu-
tion by creating an implicit novel association during the learning
phase. This manipulation aﬀected the cross-modal congruency
eﬀect that we observed in Experiment 1. The fact that we exposed
participants to a pair of cross-modal features might have reduced
the inﬂuence of coupling priors for the pair. As a consequence,
the priming eﬀect that we observed can be considered to be a
measure of the modiﬁcation of the inﬂuence of the coupling prior
for the pair. As soon as one of element of the unit is presented the
systemmakes an assumption about (or simulates) the presence of
the other. Given that we observed a modulation of the priming
eﬀect depending on the SOA, we can argue that this assumption
(or simulation) is more likely to occur at a perceptual stage rather
than a decisional stage (for similar consideration, see Brunel et al.,
2009, 2010, 2013; Evans and Treisman, 2010; Rey et al., 2014,
2015; Riou et al., 2014). Finally, it seems that learning congru-
ent stimuli leads to the creation of “stronger” units (or coupling)
over time because the system already has repeatedly experienced
that these stimuli go together. Moreover, our results seem to indi-
cate that the system does not need a large sampling of experiences
to establish such prior knowledge distribution (or coupling prior).
Indeed, the fact that we replicate our results in both Experiments
2a,b showed that the prior knowledge distribution depends on the
experiences of the cognitive system rather than being exclusively
built-in. Otherwise, we would not have observed a priming eﬀect
in Experiment 2b that conceptually replicated the one found in
Experiment 2a.
Conclusion
Our results support the idea that cross-modal correspondences,
through the modiﬁcation of coupling priors, modulate cross-
modal integration during perceptual learning. Thus, percep-
tual consciousness could be considered as emerging from the
integration of the current situation and the knowledge about
prior situations. In that case, we can envisage that integra-
tion is crucial to conscious processing and might be a form
of signature to those processing (see also, Dehaene et al.,
2014)
However, there are still remaining open questions about
how cross-modal integration might be linked to a very
speciﬁc form of perceptual consciousness (e.g., synesthesia).
Like for cross-modal correspondences, synesthetic experiences
could be considered as structurally, semantically or statisti-
cally mediated (see Spence, 2011). However, recent ﬁndings
seem to indicate that synesthetic experience could be under-
stood as a consequence of some hyper-integration (or hyper-
binding, see Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012) between
an unusually large number of sensory or semantic attribute
domains. This would be consistent with the idea that inte-
gration could be involved during the emergence of conscious
states.
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